Various least core concepts including the classical least core of cooperative games are discussed. By a reduction from minimum cover problems, we prove that computing an element in these least cores is in general N P-hard for minimum cost spannning tree games. As a consequence, computing the nucleolus, the nucleon and the per-capita nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games is also N P-hard. Date: 10 March, 1999. 1991 
INTRODUCTION
Minimum cost spanning tree problems have been widely studied in the literature. After their introduction by Bird [1976] , various results about the core and nucleolus were established (see, e:g:, Aarts [1994] , Granot and Huberman [1981] , [1984] ).
In this note, we discuss the least core of a cooperative game (see Maschler et al. [1979] ) and several variants of this solution concept. We prove that computing an allocation according to these least core concepts is in general N P-hard for minimum cost spanning tree games. It was shown in Faigle et al. [1998b] that computing the nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games is N P-hard. We obtain this result as an immediate corollary from our main result. Furthermore, we are able to show that computing other solution concepts such as the nucleon (cf. Faigle et al. [1998a] ) of minimum cost spanning tree games is N P-hard.
A cooperative game is described by a pair .N; c/, where N is a finite set of n players and c : 2 N → R + is a cost function satisfying c.∅/ = 0: A coalition is a subset S ⊆ N. c.S/ is called the cost of coalition S with the interpretation that c.S/ is the joint cost of the players in S if they decide to cooperate.
A central problem in cooperative game theory is to find a 'fair' allocation of the total costs c.N / to the players. A vector x ∈ R N is an allocation if x.N / = c.N /.
(Throughout the paper, we use the shorthand notation x.S/ = i∈S x i .)
The idea of the core of a game essentially goes back to von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] . core(c) is the set of all allocations x for which there is no coalition S ⊆ N such that x.S/ > c.S/, which means that no coalition should have to pay more than its cost.
There are games for which core(c) is empty. The least core of a game attempts to maximize the satisfaction c.S/ − x.S/ over all coalitions S = ∅; N. leastcore(c) is defined to consist of all optimal solutions x for the linear program
It is not hard to see that leastcore(c) is non-empty.
A minimum cost spanning tree game (MCST-game, for short) is defined by a set N of players, a supply node s = ∈ N, a complete graph with vertex set V = N ∪ {s} and by a non-negative distance or length function l ≥ 0 defined on the edge set of the complete graph. The cost c.S/ of a coalition S ⊆ N is, by definition, the length of a minimum spanning tree in the subgraph induced by S ∪ {s}.
It is well-known that core(c) is non-empty for MCST-games and core vectors can be found in polynomial time: Suppose T is a minimum spanning tree belonging to a MCST-game. Let x be the allocation vector that allocates to player i ∈ N the weight of the first edge i encounters on the (unique) path from i to s in T. Granot and Huberman [1981] have proved that x ∈ core(c).
However, Granot and Huberman [1981] also point out that allocation vectors obtained from the construction above may not be acceptable from a modeling point of view. This motivates the search for allocations for example in the least core and the following generalization of this solution concept. Consider the set of allocation vectors that are optimal solutions of the linear program
for a given function f : 2 N → R + . Denote this set by f -leastcore(c). Obviously, the larger f .S/ is for some coalition S ⊆ N, the more decisive S is for determining the optimum value of (P f ). We therefore call a function f as above a priority function, which is closely related to the concept of a taxation function (see, e.g., Shapley and Shubik [1966] , Tijs and Driessen [1986] ). Note that f ≡ 1 corresponds with the classical least core of Maschler et al. [1979] . Moreover, because of the non-emptiness of core(c) of a MCST-game,
The proof uses a reduction from minimum cover problems. We show that computing a leastcore-allocation for a special class of graphs introduced in Faigle et al. [1997] is already N P-hard. These graphs will be treated in Section 2. Section 3 contains the proof of the theorem. In this section, we also introduce the f -nucleolus which is a generalization of the nucleolus (see Schmeidler [1969] ). In Section 4, the functions mentioned above are treated. By giving sufficient conditions for a priority function f to satisfy a number of properties defined in Section 3, we prove that computing an element of f -leastcore(c) of MCST-games is N P-hard for these functions. As a consequence of the main theorem, computing the nucleolus, the nucleon and the per-capita nucleolus of MCST-games is in general N P-hard. We end this section by mentioning some open problems.
EXACT COVER GRAPHS
Let q ∈ N, and let U be a set of k ≥ q elements and W be a set of 3q elements.
Consider a bipartite graph with node set U ∪ W (partitioned into U and W) such that each node u ∈ U is adjacent to exactly three nodes in W. We say that the node u ∈ U covers its three neighbors in W.
A minimum cover is a cover that minimizes |D|. Finding a minimum cover is a wellknown N P-hard problem. It includes the N P-complete problem known as EXACT 3-COVER ("X3C") (cf. Garey and Johnson [1979] ).
Even finding a minimum cover under the following assumptions is N P-hard.
(C1) Each node in W has degree 2 or more.
(C2) The size of a minimum cover is at most q + 2. This can be shown as follows: Suppose w ∈ W is a node with degree 1, w is connected to u and u is also connected to w 1 and w 2 . Add a vertexû to U and connect it to w, w 1 and w 2 . The size of a minimum cover will not change. Hence computing the size of a minimum cover, in case (C1) holds, is at least as hard as computing the size of a minimimum cover in the general case. To show the validity of (C2), add vertices u 1 ; u 2 ; : : : ; u q to U that cover W. Each u i .i = 1; : : : ; q/ covers exactly 3 vertices in W. Next delete u q . The size of a minimum cover will be less than or equal to q + 2. If the size is greater than q, the original problem has no exact cover. If the size of a minimum cover is equal to q, then also delete u q−1 . Again the size of a minimum cover will be at most q + 2. If the size is greater than q, the original problem has no exact cover. If the size is equal to q, also delete u q−2 and so on. In each step of the procedure only problems that have a minimum cover with size at most q + 2 are considered. If u 1 would be deleted, one arrives at the original problem. Hence computing the size of a mimimum cover, in case (C2) holds, is at least as hard as computing the size of a minimum cover in the general case.
We construct an MCST-game from a minimum cover problem as follows (cf. We extend G to the complete graph G on V with distances induced from G, i:e:, if e = .i; j/ is an edge in G, then l.i; j/ is the length of a shortest path from i to j in G.
A minimum spanning tree ("MST") in G is obtained by connecting each w ∈ W to some u ∈ U by which it is covered. Such a u ∈ U exists because each node w ∈ W has a neighbor in U (indeed, it has at least 2 neighbors in U). Then one connects each u ∈ U to St, and finally connects St to g and g to s. The resulting MST has a total length of c.N / = 3q.q + 1/ + kq + 3q:
LEAST CORE CONCEPTS 5 Furthermore note that, by (C1), each w ∈ W is covered by at least two vertices in U. Hence it is straightforward to see that the following property holds for G:
3 Hence, by property (L) of the previous section, the feasibility constraints of . P f / imply the following inequalities
Furthermore, the coalition S = N\{g} can be connected to the supply node s at a total cost of c.N /. Hence, the feasibility constraints of . P f / also imply
This motivates the following definition.
For ž > 0, let x ž ∈ R N be the vector defined by
Motivated by the examples mentioned in Section 1, we restrict our attention to priority functions f that depend only on the size and the cost of a coalition, i.e., we consider functions (also denoted by f ) of the type f : N × R → R + , which we always assume to be efficiently computable, and set f .S/ = f .|S|; c.S//. For technical reasons, we assume that f .S/ > 0 whenever |S| > 0 and c.S/ > 0.
It is straightforward to check that the following parameters do not depend on the particular representative w ∈ W or u ∈ U: 
As a consequence, we can a priori compute all possible values of ž f .D/ for |D| ranging from q to k. Lemma 3.1. If ž * is the optimal value of . P f / then ž * ≤ ž f .
Proof:
Let .x; ž * / be an optimal solution of (P f ). As we have seen, the feasibility constraints imply 
We call a priority function f : 2 N → R + feasible if f satisfies the following properties (with respect to MCST-games on minimum cover graphs):
(P1) ž f is the optimal value of . P f /:
(P2) For a cover D ⊆ U of size q ≤ |D| ≤ q + 2, we have
Our main result can be formulated as follows:
Theorem 3.1. For the class of feasible priority functions, the problem of computing an allocation vector x ∈ f -leastcore(c) of MCST-games is N P-hard.
Proof: First we will show that for all w ∈ W
x.w/ = q + 1 + ž f f w :
Suppose .
x; ž f / is an optimal solution of . P f /. The feasibility constraints imply
Hence x ∈ f -leastcore(c) provides us with the value of the parameter ž f . We can efficiently compute the size |D| of a minimum cover D ⊆ U as follows: Compute ž f .D/ for |D| = q, |D| = q + 1 and |D| = q + 2 (cf. Remark 3.1). By (C2), it suffices to compute ž f .D/ only for these sizes. By (P2), ž f = ž f .D/ for at least one of these sizes. Note that a cover D of size |D| ≤ k − 2 implies the existence of covers with size |D| + 1 and |D| + 2. Hence, by (P2), the size of a minimum cover |D| will be the maximum of the sizes for which equality holds.
Given an allocation vector x ∈ f -leastcore(c), we can thus compute the size of a minimum cover D in polynomial time. Hence the computation of such a vector is at least as hard as the computation of the size of a minimum cover. To show that (P1) holds for f , let D ⊆ U be a minimum cover. Hence ž f = ž f .D/.
We claim that ž f = ž * , the optimum value of (P f ). By Lemma 3.1, it suffices to show that ž f is a feasible value for (P f ).
Suppose .x 1 ; ž f 1 / is an optimal solution for (P f 1 ) and .x 2 ; ž f 2 / is an optimal solution for (P f 2 ). Define
(Note that x.N / = c.N / because x 1 and x 2 are allocations.)
Suppose S N; S = ∅: Then
♦ For f given by f .S/ = 1 for all S = ∅; N, the f -nucleolus is equal to the nucleolus (see Schmeidler [1969] ). For f given by f .S/ = c.S/ for all S = ∅; N, the f -nucleolus is called the nucleon (see Faigle et al. [1998a] ) and for f given by f .S/ = |S| for all S = ∅; N, the f -nucleolus is called the per-capita nucleolus (see, e.g., Young et al. [1982] ).
Because it is clear that f -nucleolus(c) ⊆ f -leastcore(c), the following corollary holds. 
Then |S| > 1 2 q − 1 2 − M > 1 3 q (for q sufficiently large). This completes the proof of (4.2). We now continue the proof of the theorem by establishing a sequence of claims. 
Hence
Then contradicting the maximality of Ž.S/:
We have proved that 
